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Sense of agency refers to the feeling of controlling an external event through one’s own
action. On one influential view, agency depends on how predictable the consequences
of one’s action are, getting stronger as the match between predicted and actual effect
of an action gets closer. Thus, sense of agency arises when external events that follow
our action are consistent with predictions of action effects made by the motor system
while we perform or simply intend to perform an action. According to this view, agency
is inferred retrospectively, after an action has been performed and its consequences are
known. In contrast, little is known about whether and how internal processes involved
in the selection of actions may influence subjective sense of control, in advance of the
action itself, and irrespective of effect predictability. In this article, we review several
classes of behavioral and neuroimaging data suggesting that earlier processes, linked to
fluency of action selection, prospectively contribute to sense of agency. These findings
have important implications for better understanding human volition and abnormalities of
action experience.
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ACTION-EFFECT LINK AND COMPARATOR MODELS: A
RETROSPECTIVE ACCOUNT OF AGENCY
Agency is a key component of action experience. In a nutshell,
agency refers to the sense of controlling one’s own actions and,
through these actions, events in the outside world. We rarely
have an intense, clear phenomenology of agency, but we clearly
recognize failures of agency when we experience actions that
do not unfold as expected or fail to produce intended effects.
One might even say that our sense of “authorship” becomes
apparent only when it is falsified, resulting in a break of the
flow from intentions to action effects that normally characterize
experience. Thus, determining where the sense of agency comes
from requires properly specifying where the break may occur
along the intention-action-effect chain. Identifying the break may
in turn depend on how we choose to specify the chain, and on the
causal relation between its constituents (intention, action, effect).
On one influential view, agency implies a control mechanism
that causally relates actions to their effects. More specifically, it
implies a mechanism that has goals, and that controls actions
to achieve them. This mechanism was first, and successfully,
formalized as a comparator model (Wolpert et al., 1995; Miall
and Wolpert, 1996). In its first incarnation, a comparator model
translates intentions into outcomes, by continually monitoring
whether action consequences occur, or do not occur, as pre-
dicted. Though originally formulated as models of motor control
(Wolpert et al., 1995), comparator models have also been
increasingly used to explain the subjective sense of agency (e.g.,
Blakemore et al., 2001). On the comparator account, agency
is computed by matching predicted and actually experienced
consequences of movement. In this framework, action effects
are precisely those sensory events that can be predicted from
one’s intentions, using the specific intermediate mechanism of
the comparator model (Wolpert et al., 1995; Figure 1A). Thus,
the comparator model allows for two specific predictions. First,
sense of agency should be strong when there is a close match
between the predicted and the actual sensory consequences of an
action, and should be reduced when predicted and experienced
consequences do not match. Second, sense of agency necessarily
occurs late, i.e., after an action has been performed, and sensory
evidence about the consequences of action becomes available.
This view has received considerable empirical support from
studies showing that spatial and temporal discrepancies between
making an action and viewing visual feedback of the action reduce
the sense that the observed action is one’s own. Thus, introducing
a spatial transformation between an action and its visual conse-
quences reduces participants’ sense of agency in proportion to
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Intention-Action-Effect chain. The action-selection
processes operate between the formation of the initial intention and
action execution. Dysfluency of action selection signals a break in the
intention-action link, that occurs prior to the action and its sensory
consequences. After the action has been selected, predicted and
perceived consequences of this action are compared. On the comparator
account (in bold), sense of agency is strong when there is a match
between predicted and actually experienced consequences of an action,
and is reduced in the case of a mismatch. (B) Example trial from the
prime-target incompatible condition, adapted from Chambon et al. (2013).
Participants were instructed to respond to the target stimulus, and were
not informed of the presence of the arrow primes. Action effects
consisted of colored circles that appeared on the screen after a varying
delay. In this condition, sense of agency decreases relative to the
compatible condition, even though predicted and perceived action effects
are the same (yellow circles).
the mismatch induced. In one typical task, participants received
distorted visual feedback of their hand moving a joystick. When
the movement of the virtual hand did not correspond to the
subjects’ movement (Farrer and Frith, 2002), or when an angular
bias was introduced between the subject’s and the virtual hand’s
movement, participants more readily attributed it to another
agent (Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998; Farrer et al., 2003; Synofzik
et al., 2006; David et al., 2007). Note that manipulating tempo-
ral relations between actions and outcomes had similar effects
(Franck et al., 2001; Leube et al., 2003; MacDonald and Paus,
2003; David et al., 2007, 2011; Farrer et al., 2008). The so-called
“intentional binding” effect provides another line of evidence for
the role of temporal contiguity between action and outcome in
the building of agency. The intentional binding effect has been
first reported by Haggard et al. (2002): it refers to the subjective
compression of the temporal interval between a voluntary action
and its external sensory consequences. Thus, actions are perceived
as shifted in time towards the outcomes that they cause, while
outcomes are perceived as shifted back in time towards the actions
that cause them (see Moore and Obhi, 2012, for a review). This
temporal attraction is absent in cases of involuntary or passive
movement. Equally, when participants simply judge the interval
between action and effect, their judgments show a perceptual
compression absent for equivalent passive movements (Engbert
et al., 2008). The intentional binding effect would constitute an
implicit, but reliable, measure of agency, as it only occurs when
events in the external environment are precisely recognized as the
consequences of one’s action.
On comparator accounts, a positive sense of agency is the
default operation when no mismatch between predicted and
current states occurs (see Synofzik et al., 2008). It is the experi-
ential output of sub-personal processes that mostly run outside
consciousness. Crucially, although sense of agency relies on real-
time motor signals, it can only be computed after those signals
are compared with reafferent feedback. Thus, a reliable, explicit
sense of agency may only be formed when reafferent (visual,
motor, or proprioceptive) signals become available for matching
with intentions. Thus, one cannot feel agency over any event
until that event has been registered and processed in the brain.
As a consequence, agency can only be retrospectively attributed,
although it is informed by on-line signals about motor guidance
and control (Chambon and Haggard, 2013).
Note the retrospective account on agency has several
advantages. First, it is grounded on several classes of converging
behavioral and neuroimaging evidence. Second, it primarily relies
on a computational model that provides a convincing explana-
tion for the link between action and effect: action effects are
sensory events that can be predicted from one’s action plans.
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However, an alternative possibility, that sense of agency is also
generated prospectively, in advance of the action itself and before
knowing the actual effect of actions, has received recent support
(Wenke et al., 2010). On this view, selecting between alternative
possible actions might itself generate a sense of agency. This view
places a new emphasis on the intention-action, rather than the
action-effect, link—i.e., on the process through which intentions
are transformed into specific actions, to achieve desired effects.
Importantly, this view suggests that agency may depend on real-
time, prospective signals arising from internal circuits of action
preparation, rather than on a post-hoc, retrospective comparison
between predicted and current states of the environment.
INTENTION-ACTION LINK AND SELECTION FLUENCY: A
PROSPECTIVE ACCOUNT OF AGENCY
Previous studies have shown that judgments of agency tend to
be related to how participants think that they perform in a task
(Metcalfe and Greene, 2007). Similarly, errors in task performance
may lead to a feeling of dysfluency during the task, without any
explicit awareness of an error, and without the ability to explicitly
report the error. Thus, a feeling that something went “wrong”
during the control of instrumental action may be sufficient to
modulate later judgments of control, even without being able to
identify or explicitly report the error. The term “epistemic feeling”
has been coined to describe this subjective, on-line, experience of
an error (Arango-Muñoz, 2010; Charles et al., 2013). Importantly,
such on-line experience strongly influences the sense of agency,
as shown by recent priming studies. Thus, Wenke and colleagues
showed that the sense of agency could be modulated by using sub-
liminal priming to affect the fluency of action selection processes
(Wenke et al., 2010; Haggard and Chambon, 2012, for a review).
Interestingly, this procedure enabled a manipulation of the sub-
jective sense of agency, without manipulating the predictability
of action outcomes. In this experiment, participants pressed left
or right keys in response to left- or right-pointing arrow targets.
Prior to the target, subliminal left or right arrow primes were pre-
sented, unbeknownst to the subject. Prime arrow directions were
either identical (compatible condition) or opposite (incompatible
condition) to the subsequent target (Figure 1B). Responding to
the target caused the appearance of a color after a jittered delay.
The color patch can thus be considered as the action outcome. The
specific color shown depended on whether the participant’s action
was compatible or incompatible with the preceding subliminal
prime, but did not depend on the prime identity or the chosen
action alternative alone. Unlike previous studies, therefore, the
primes did not predict action effects, nor could any specific color
be predicted on the basis of the action chosen. Participants rated
how much control they experienced over the different colors at
the end of each block (Wenke et al., 2010).
Analyses of reaction times (RTs) showed that compatible
primes facilitated responding whereas incompatible primes inter-
fered with response selection. More importantly, priming also
modulated the sense of agency over action effects: participants
experienced more control over colors that followed actions
compatible with the preceding primes than over colors that
followed prime-incompatible actions. Thus subliminal priming
made action selection processes more or less fluent, and this
modulation of fluency affected the sense of agency over action
outcomes.1
These results have several important cognitive implications.
First, they suggest that the sense of agency depends strongly on
processes of action selection that necessarily occur before action
itself. Second, strong sense of agency may be associated with
fluent, uncontested action selection. In contrast, conflict between
alternative possible actions, such as that caused by incompati-
ble subliminal priming, may reduce the feeling of control over
action outcomes. Third, this prospective contribution of action
selection processes to sense of agency is distinct from predicting
the outcomes of action, since action outcomes were equally (un-)
predictable for compatible and incompatible primes. That is,
these primes did not prime effects of action as in previous studies
(e.g., Wegner and Wheatley, 1999; Aarts et al., 2005; Linser and
Goschke, 2007; Sato, 2009). Therefore, participants could not
retrospectively base their control judgements on match between
primes and effects alone. Rather, their stronger experience of
control when primes were compatible could only be explained by
the fluency of action selection—i.e., by a signal experienced before
the action was made, and the effect was displayed.
Finally, participants did not consciously perceive the sublim-
inal primes. Therefore, participants’ sense of agency could not
be based on (conscious) beliefs about the primes. Instead, action
priming itself presumably directly influenced the subjective sense
of agency. Pacherie (Pacherie, 2008; see also Synofzik et al., 2008)
has suggested that action selection conflict need not necessarily
be conscious (Morsella et al., 2009). Such conflict may elicit the
feeling “that something is wrong”, without necessarily leading to
knowledge about what is wrong. Wenke et al.’s study shows that
subjects can rely on this implicit feeling to make judgments about
their own control over action effects.2
DISSOCIATING PROSPECTIVE SENSE OF AGENCY FROM
MOTOR PERFORMANCE
Wenke et al.’s findings suggest that monitoring fluency signals
generated during action selection could be an important marker
for the experience of agency. However, it is also possible that
1Subliminal priming would facilitate action selection by reducing conflict
between alternative action programmes (Fleming et al., 2009). This facilitation
of premotor processing would precisely be experienced as a feeling of action
fluency, while the opposite effect of conflict between alternative actions would
be experienced as dysfluency. Note this suggestion is analogous to the well-
accepted way that the feeling of “effort” is seen, as the experiential output of an
increased demand in cognitive control (McGuire and Botvinick, 2010). Con-
versely, the literature usually defines fluency as an experiential consequence
of smooth, effortless cognitive processing (e.g., Oppenheimer, 2008). In this
sense, both terms are interchangeable—a fluent processing is an effortless
processing–, and both may prospectively inform agency (e.g., Demanet et al.,
2013).
2We take that selection fluency does not require to be explicitly represented to
inform conscious experience of action. In fact, recent data suggest that fluency
signals need to be kept implicit in order to influence agency on compatible
trials—i.e., in order to be mistaken for actual control over action effects.
Indeed, when primes are consciously perceived (i.e., presented at a supra-
liminal threshold), the compatibility effect is reversed: sense of agency is
higher on incompatible trials (Damen et al., 2014).
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participants might have estimated agency based on implicit mon-
itoring of their own performance, such as their RTs. Since RTs
are lower on compatibly primed trials (Dehaene et al., 1998;
Schlaghecken and Eimer, 2000; Schlaghecken et al., 2008), par-
ticipants would therefore feel more control on compatible trials,
because they respond more rapidly. On this second view, agency
would depend on retrospective monitoring of action execution
performance (Marti et al., 2010), not on prospective monitoring
of premotor fluency signals.
To distinguish between these two accounts of sense of agency,
we used an experimental procedure that dissociated fluency of
action selection from performance monitoring (Chambon and
Haggard, 2012). Specifically, we increased the interval between
mask and target to take advantage of a Negative Compati-
bility Effect (NCE) in priming. Longer mask-target latencies
increase RTs following compatible primes, relative to incom-
patible primes (Schlaghecken et al., 2008). By combining this
factor with Wenke et al.’s design for assessing sense of agency,
it was possible to directly compare the contrasting retrospec-
tive (performance monitoring) and prospective (action selection)
accounts. Specifically, if sense of agency depends on selec-
tion fluency, it should be greater when actions are compati-
bly (fluent condition) versus incompatibly (dysfluent condition)
primed, irrespective of whether priming benefits (faster RTs)
or impairs (slower RTs) performance. Alternatively, if sense of
agency depends only on performance monitoring, it should
be stronger for rapid versus slower responding, irrespective of
whether priming is compatible or incompatible with the action
executed.
Crucially, reversing the normal relationship between prime-
target compatibility and RTs did not alter subjective sense of
agency. Thus, in compatible NCE trials, participants experienced
stronger control despite slower response times and higher error
rates, compared to incompatible NCE trials (Chambon and Hag-
gard, 2012; see also Stenner et al., 2014). These results suggest
that the feeling of control normally experienced by subjects on
compatible trials does not depend on retrospectively monitoring
performance, thereby strengthening the evidence for a prospective
contribution of action selection fluency to sense of agency.
In both Wenke et al.’s (2010) and Chambon and Hag-
gard’s (2012), experiments, priming did not influence the actual
objective level of control that participants had over the colors
presented after their actions. Indeed, the contingency between
action and color effect was similar for compatibly-primed and
incompatibly-primed trials. Importantly, the prospective sense of
control identified in these experiments is therefore an illusion
of control, since it is not based on differences in the actual
statistical relation between action and effect. In other words,
action selection is irrelevant to actual action-effect contingency,
and thus to the agent’s actual ability to drive external events.
Although illusory, this prospective sense of control may never-
theless be a convenient proxy for actual control, because agents
often just know what to do and what will happen next in most
everyday life situations. In that sense, fluent action selection is
generally a good advance predictor of actual statistical control
over the external environment (Haggard and Chambon, 2012;
Chambon et al., 2014). Prospective agency might thus reflect a
learned experiential metacognition: if we can fluently select an
appropriate action, then we are likely to get what we want, or fulfill
our intentions.
As suggested above, internal signals of premotor fluency might
not produce a strong conscious experience with distinctive con-
tent, but might influence the experience of surrounding events.
Thus, fluency of action selection would not be experienced as
such, but would presumably be experienced as something that
goes “right” or “wrong” in the control of instrumental action,
and thus seems relevant to sense of agency. In that sense, sig-
nals relating to the fluency of action selection would not be
perceived for what they really are, but (mis-)attributed to the
processes of actually controlling the action. Such a misattribution
may foster the subject not to adjust her behavior accordingly.
Indeed, it has been shown that behavioral adjustment does
not only depend on the presence or absence of an error, but
also on its cause (e.g., me vs. not-me) (Steinhauser and Kiesel,
2011). Thus, if participants misattribute dysfluency to lack of
control on the selected action, and misattribute fluency to the
process of actually controlling the action, then they should
adjust their behavior less in the dysfluent, than in the fluent,
condition—despite the fact that control is equally illusory in
both conditions. Future work is required to test this assumption
directly.
NEURAL SUBSTRATES OF PROSPECTIVE (FLUENCY-BASED)
AGENCY
Taken together, these findings suggest that neural activity in action
preparation circuits prospectively informs agency, independent of
outcome predictability, and actual performance. Tracking dys-
fluency in action selection networks (Miele et al., 2011; Nahab
et al., 2011) could be the basis for this prospective sense of
agency. Recently, we adapted the prospective agency paradigm
for functional neuroimaging (Chambon et al., 2013). Specifically,
we studied whether the angular gyrus (AG), a parietal brain
region which has been shown to compute retrospective agency
by monitoring mismatches between actions and subsequent out-
comes (Farrer et al., 2003, 2008), may also code for a prospec-
tive sense of agency, by monitoring action selection processes
in advance of the action itself, and independently of action
outcomes.
Behavioral results replicated those of Wenke and colleagues.
Again, participants experienced greater control over action effects
when the action was compatibly versus incompatibly primed
(Chambon et al., 2013). More importantly, this prospective con-
tribution of action-selection processes to sense of agency was
accounted for by exchange of signals between specific frontal
action selection areas and the parietal cortex. First, we found
that activity in the AG was sensitive to mismatches, but not
matches, between prime arrow and actual response to the target
arrow. Moreover, this activity due to the prime-target mismatch
predicted the magnitude of subsequent sense of agency: for
incompatible trials only, activity in the AG decreased as sense of
control over outcomes increased. Importantly, this neural coding
of non-agency occurred at the time of action selection only, as in
Wenke et al.’s original experiment.
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Sense of agency is accounted for by exchange of signals
across a prefrontal-parietal network: decreased DLPFC activity (in blue) due
to incompatible primes results in a concomitant increase in AG activity (in
yellow), and a subjective loss of control. The right chart shows a negative
modulation of AG activity as a function of the level of experienced control
(from low to high; adapted from Chambon et al., 2013). (B) TMS-induced
disruption of left AG at the time of action selection abolishes the compatibility
effect on sense of agency (right chart).
Second, connectivity analyses (psycho-physiological interac-
tion) revealed that activity in the AG (signaling non-agency)
in incompatible trials was negatively correlated with activity in
the dorso-lateral prefrontal area (DLPFC; Figure 2A). Previous
studies of willed action also noticed the same frontoparietal
correlation, namely, that increased activity in DLPFC was asso-
ciated with decreased activity in the AG (Frith et al., 1991). Our
results are directly analogous: compatible primes might partly
engage circuits for willed action, while prime-target incompat-
ibility might relatively decrease activity in this circuit (Wenke
et al., 2010). Thus, DLPFC deactivation would signal dysfluency
in the selection of willed action, as a consequence of prime-target
incompatibility. Decreased DLPFC activity due to incompatible
primes would in turn result in a concomitant increase in AG
activity and a subjective loss of control. Overall, this suggests
that AG may monitor signals relating to fluency or dysfluency
of action selection emanating from DLFPC and use them to
(pre)construct an experience of agency. Importantly, under this
interpretation, this monitoring of fluency signals by AG would
occur prior to actions and their sensory consequences. This
prospective contribution of AG to sense of agency can thus
be distinguished from other functions such as action outcome
monitoring. Interestingly, Farrer et al. (2008) demonstrated a
role of AG in action outcome monitoring, but found a bilateral
AG activation, which was slightly more ventral than the AG
found here. In Farrer et al.’s study, AG activation varied with
mismatch between predicted and actual sensory consequences
of an action, while AG activation in Chambon et al.’s study
was elicited by a mismatch between a prime-induced intention
and response to a target (Chambon et al., 2013). The differ-
ent localization found in these two studies could thus reflect a
subdivision within the inferior parietal cortex, with more dorsal
AG being involved in detecting mismatch between intention and
action, independent of action consequences (Chambon et al.,
2013), while more ventral AG would be involved in retrospectively
comparing predicted and actual consequences of an action (Farrer
et al., 2008).
Monitoring of fluency signals by AG might provide the subject
with an on-line, subjective marker of volition, prior to action
itself. As such, this finding sketches an important qualification
of recent post-hoc determinist views of action control (Ackerman
et al., 2010). In its strongest form, determinist views suggest
that human behavior is unconsciously determined by subtle
changes in the stimulus environment. On this view, individu-
als are not even aware of how their behavior is shaped and
transformed, although they can retrospectively integrate gen-
eral information about past actions and environmental cues to
make inferences and narrative explanations about their own
behavior (Wegner, 2002). While participants, in both Wenke’s
and Chambon’s experiments, did not have any conscious expe-
rience of the subliminal primes, they did have a real-time
subjective experience of their own action generation, which
reflected the prime’s capacity to influence action selection. In
this respect, the ability to monitor fluency signals generated
during action selection in AG might be an important part of
what makes our action intentional, and thus a key component
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of the experience of agency—defined as the feeling that we are
intentionally making things happen by our own choices and
actions.
A CAUSAL EVIDENCE FOR THE ROLE OF AG IN THE CODING
OF PROSPECTIVE AGENCY
Although informative, this fMRI study was nevertheless limited
in two key ways. First, the evidence was indirect, because of
the correlational nature of fMRI. Secondly, it was not possible
to pinpoint the precise time at which AG is involved in the
prospective coding of agency owing to the relatively poor tempo-
ral resolution of fMRI. As we saw, the issue of timing is important
for understanding where the sense of agency is computed within
the intention-action-effect chain.
We recently addressed these two limitations by combining
single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) with sub-
liminal priming of action selection and judgements of control
over action effects. On two distinct experiments we assessed
the effects of TMS over left AG on action selection process-
ing, by linking TMS to either (i) the presentation of the arrow
target; (ii) to action execution; or (iii) to the presentation of
the action effect (color patch). We made specific predictions
based on our previous fMRI findings. Because AG activation
correlated with sense of agency only on incompatible trials, we
assumed that this area monitored signals relating to selection
fluency generated by DLPFC (Chambon et al., 2013). In this
case, applying TMS over AG should prevent this region from
monitoring any signals from DLPFC, and hence reduce the
tendency for incompatibility primes to influence judgements of
control.
Consistent with these predictions, we found that TMS over
left AG abolished the compatibility effect (i.e., the difference
between compatible and incompatible conditions) on sense of
agency at the time of action selection only (Figure 2B), while
TMS delivered shortly after presentation of the action effect did
not alter experienced agency. Importantly, TMS had no effect
on RTs. This suggests that TMS-induced disruption of AG did
not interfere with action selection processing itself, but rather
interfered with a circuit that monitors selection fluency to pre-
construct the experience of control.
Previously it is has been suggested that the AG is involved
in the retrospective construction of sense of agency by mon-
itoring the consistency between predicted and actual sensory
consequences of movements (David et al., 2008, for a review).
When these predictions are violated sense of agency is reduced,
and AG activity is increased. Results from our TMS study do not
disagree with this view of AG function, but point to an additional
role: by monitoring the consistency between action plans and
required actions, the AG is also involved in earlier prospective
aspects of sense of agency, relating to action selection and action
programming.
Note the prospective and retrospective mechanisms have some
general features in common. Both involve monitoring action-
related signals or “cues” (such as re-afferent sensory feedback) as
they become available, and comparing them with other relevant
information for consistency (see Moore et al., 2009). We suggest
that monitoring and checking is a very general function of the
AG during instrumental action. Initial action intentions, such
as those caused by subliminal primes in the series of studies
described above, could be checked for compatibility with the
action subsequently performed. These action selection cues may
provide an important “online” marker of control as the action
is unfolding. Not only would this provide an estimate of agency
without the need to wait until sensory feedback becomes available
but, as we have suggested (Chambon et al., 2013), it may protect
against aberrant experiences of agency. For example, the sense of
agency in patients with schizophrenia is characterised by excessive
reliance on re-afferent sensory information generated by their
actions, presumably due to poor, or unreliable, action selection
processing (Voss et al., 2010). Prospective signals—such as fluency
signals—may indeed provide an important counterweight to re-
afferent information, and hence may protect against xenopathic
experiences (e.g., loss of control over one’s actions and thoughts)
such as those experienced in passivity symptoms. At the same
time, excessive reliance on these prospective signals may produce
the opposite delusion of omnipotence, in which the mere deci-
sion to act is incorrectly assumed to produce successful action
outcomes. This latter illusion appears to be common in historical
despots but is interestingly absent in depressed people (Alloy and
Abramson, 1979). A robust and reliable sense of agency may thus
require a balanced—and probably context-dependent—mixture
of both prospective and retrospective components. Future work is
required to test whether other (contextual of individual) factors
may influence the interplay between these two components. For
example, it has been convincingly suggested that priming effects
on the experience of agency depend on the level at which the
agent represents her behavior (van der Weiden et al., 2010).
Thus, while some people represent their own behavior at a low-
level (i.e., the instrumental level: in terms of how an action is
done), some others represent their behavior at a higher level
(i.e., the outcome level: in terms of why an action is done).
Interestingly, the former may depend more heavily on prospec-
tive cues to agency (e.g., selection fluency), whereas the latter
may show excessive reliance on retrospective information—i.e.,
on general information about past actions and outcome-related
cues.
LINKING FLUENCY TO OUTCOME PREDICTABILITY
Recent accounts of agency have highlighted that it results from
the integration of various cues (Synofzik et al., 2008; Moore
and Fletcher, 2012), which may emerge at different times (Farrer
et al., 2013). Namely, it has been suggested that several agency
cues may be weighted by their reliability in order to obtain a
“Bayesian optimal” estimate of true agency (Moore and Fletcher,
2012). This view has received some support as studies have
shown, for example, that changes in action-contingency affected
the weighting of predictive and postdictive cues (Moore and
Haggard, 2008; Wolpe et al., 2013). As outcome predictability
was reduced, there was a greater reliance on post-hoc, inferential
processes.
In the action priming studies described above, outcomes were
fully contingent on a given action, in order to hold outcome
predictability constant. However, it remained unclear whether
action selection fluency would still be a relevant cue to agency in
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a context of greater uncertainty about action-outcome relations.
Given our previous proposal that action selection fluency could
serve as an advance predictor of successful action (Chambon and
Haggard, 2012), one might predict that reducing action-outcome
contingency would reduce the contribution of the prospective
(fluency-based) relative to the retrospective (outcome-based) cue,
to sense of agency. That is, if the outcome monitoring revealed
that the action was in fact unsuccessful—i.e., outcomes did not
match expectations, then the fluency of action selection would no
longer be relevant.
To test this, we adapted our previous paradigm (e.g., Chambon
et al., 2013) to involve a reduced contingency between actions
and outcomes (Sidarus et al., 2013). Thus, a given action was
associated with two possible colored outcomes on 66% of trials,
but these colors would appear after the alternative action on the
remaining 33% of trials. This allowed us to create situations in
which outcomes could either match or mismatch expectations,
given action-outcome contingencies. In addition, these outcomes
would follow actions that were either compatibly or incompatibly
primed. Therefore, we could assess the relative contribution of
a prospective cue—action selection fluency, with a retrospective
cue—outcome monitoring.
Results showed that participants’ sense of agency was sensitive
to manipulations of both the prospective and the retrospective
cues. Compatibly primed actions were associated with higher con-
trol ratings than incompatibly primed actions. Additionally, par-
ticipants reported a stronger sense of agency when the outcome
was expected, compared to when the outcome was unexpected.
More importantly, there was an interaction between the two vari-
ables. Incompatible action priming led to a significant reduction
in control ratings when outcomes were unexpected, but not when
outcomes were expected. At the same time, unexpected outcomes
only reduced control ratings significantly when they followed
incompatibly primed actions, and not compatibly primed actions
(Sidarus et al., 2013). Thus, contrary to our predictions, selection
fluency had a larger impact on sense of agency when outcomes
were unexpected.
These findings reiterate the importance of action selection
processes to the sense of agency. Even though outcomes were
less predictable than in previous studies, we still found a similar
effect of action priming on control ratings. What is more, the
interaction between selection fluency and outcome expectation
suggests that the sense of agency does not merely reflect informa-
tion about action-outcome relations (e.g., Metcalfe and Greene,
2007). The sense of agency was drastically reduced only when both
action selection was dysfluent and the outcome was unexpected.
Prospective cues related to action selection fluency may thus
make an independent contribution to the sense of agency from
retrospective, outcome-based, cues.
Our findings are also not fully compatible with the cue
integration models presently proposed for agency computation
(Moore and Fletcher, 2012). Within this framework, it is the
reliability of a given cue that determines its impact on the
resulting sense of agency. Reliability is, however, a feature of
the distribution of events. Thus, changes in cue reliability can
only be assessed over a number of trials. Instead, our results
suggest that the specific information carried by a given cue in
a single trial can alter its weight relative to other cues. More
complex Bayesian models of cue integration might be able to
encompass these dynamic changes in cue weight. Yet, as men-
tioned above, perhaps a complete account of the sense of agency
cannot be provided by simply maximising information about
action-outcome relations.
These results overall support the idea that agency is the
“default” assumption, which is only falsified, or reduced, when
there is “sufficient” evidence against it.3 In some circumstances,
it might be adaptive to maintain a sense of agency in the face of
unexpected outcomes. Our environment mostly does not afford
us fully predictable and contingent relations between actions and
outcomes, but rather these tend to be probabilistic in nature. As
such, we can learn these predictive relations, but we must also
admit that predictions may be violated either due to the known
statistical relations (e.g., when it is 66%), or due to random or
outlier events. This type of expected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan,
2005) suggests that a mismatch between prediction and outcome
does not always imply that the environment has changed, and
one is not in control. In these situations, agency may be retained
depending on information from other available cues, namely
internal signals related to action selection.
ACTION SELECTION, AGENCY, AND EXPERTISE
Interestingly, the experience associated to selection fluency
(at least partly) overlaps with the phenomenal properties of
what has been formalized as “flow” in positive psychology
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). The flow is a particular mental state,
described by expert people as a feeling of mindfulness and total
commitment to the task at hand, often associated with an experi-
ence of a dilation of subjective time (Witt and Sugovic, 2010; see
also Hagura et al., 2012). In some professional tennis players, for
example, this feeling of “flow”, resulting from a fluently selected
(and perfectly executed) backhand stroke, may be associated with
a “premonitory” anticipation of where the ball is going to hit the
ground (Murphy and White, 1978). Consistently, our findings
suggest that people may use the fluency (or ease) with which an
action is selected as a good advance predictor of actual statistical
control over the external environment.
Two hypotheses can be considered to account for the use
of fluency signals in daily life. Using these signals adequately
could first require learning stable relations between actions (e.g.,
the backhand stroke) and outcomes (e.g., where the tennis ball
hit the court on average after that specific backhand). Indeed,
simply having a feeling of fluently knowing which action to select
does not guarantee the correct action outcome. Thus, fluency-
based behaviors might only develop with expertise, once the
brain has shifted from supervisory control to automatic or expert
control. Under the expert regime, fluency would be used as an
3Whereas subjects experience less control when presented with incompatibly
vs. neutrally-primed (using “neutral” primes constructed by superimposing
left- and right-oriented primes), they do not feel more control when com-
patibly vs. neutrally-primed (Chambon and Haggard, 2012). These results
are consistent with previous accounts suggesting that agency is a default
experience. On this view, sense of agency would only really become apparent as
a sense of non-agency, when the normal flow from our intentions to the effects
of our actions is broken (Haggard, 2005; Chambon and Haggard, 2013).
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implicit proxy for the current status (success or failure) of the
action unfolding (Haggard and Chambon, 2012), and would
substitute for explicit monitoring of the action-effect link through
short-circuiting the process of “checking” the actual consequences
of our actions.
In contrast, an alternative hypothesis would propose that we
learn in our everyday lives to use fluency of action selection as a
reliable cue to agency. Fluency signals may become a heuristics
for assessing one’s control over the external world, and we might
even rely more on this heuristics in novel or uncertain situations.
Before we know the statistical contingency between an action and
its outcome in a given situation, we still have a sense of agency
over what we do. Hence, we might rely on selection fluency to
guide this sense of agency, until the more reliable action-outcome
contingency cue is available. Although the Sidarus et al. (2013)
study may provide some support for this alternative hypothesis,
further research is needed to explore how the role of different
agency cues may shift over time, during the learning of action-
outcome relations. Similarly, high levels of expertise in complex
tasks may involve the recruitment of different processes, and also
affect the types of cues that inform the sense of agency.
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